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ir Thomas More’s Utopia, it has been argued, is the 
benchmark by which all subsequent literary depictions of 
imaginary ideal societies must be measured.  However, 
More’s effort to conceptualize novel social arrangements was not 
at all new for his time.  At least since Plato’s Republic highly 
descriptive accounts of hypothetical communities have been 
carefully recorded.  It is the narrative form of the traveler 
discovering a foreign and perfectly organized society, described in 
a concrete and detailed manner, which was More’s fresh 
contribution.1  Krishan Kumar acknowledges the significance of 
this development in his Utopianism, in which he states that: “With 
the invention of utopia, we cross the divide between ancient and 
modern history.”2 
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UTOPIANISM: A THEORETICAL NECESSITY 
 
Utopia, moreover, plays as important a role in political circles as it 
does in literary ones.  More’s Utopia is no mere fantasy: it can be 
read as a scathing criticism of both the governmental policies and 
everyday attitudes of the people of sixteenth century England.3 
Given the dual nature of utopias—their being both literary and 
political—we can identify at least two distinct facets of the utopian 
project: the constructive (imaginative; exploratory) side and the 
critical (reformist; satirical) side.4  Both of these functions of 
utopias, Kumar believes, are dynamically interrelated and essential 
to the practice of political philosophy. 
With the historical developments of the late twentieth century 
still fresh in our collective memory (most notably the ascents and 
eventual failures of fascism and Stalinist communism), utopianism 
has fallen into conceptual disfavor, and unfairly so.  It is a mistake 
to link utopianism only with its miscarriages without considering 
its successes (liberal democracy and cosmopolitanism were, for 
example, at one time nothing more than the wishful thoughts of a 
handful of intellectuals).  The thesis of this paper is that utopianism 
is a theoretical necessity—we couldn’t, for example, engage in 
normative political philosophy without it5—and, further, that in 
consciously embracing utopianism we will consequently 
experience an enrichment of our political lives.  Thus, the title of 
my paper, “The Normative Role of Utopianism in Political 
Philosophy,” has a double meaning: it highlights the fact that 
utopianism always plays a normative role in political philosophy, 
as its concern is inevitably the promotion of a certain vision of the 
good life; and secondly it suggests that there normatively ‘ought to 
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be’ a recognized and respectable role for utopianism within 
political philosophy.  The first meaning, I believe, is self-
explanatory.  Regarding the second, it expresses my hope to—in 
short—take what is old, and through a modest process of 
rehabilitation, make it new again. 
 
 
UTOPIA IN DISREPUTE 
 
Would you like to swing on a star? 
Carry moonbeams home in a jar? 
And be better off than you are?6 
 
If we define utopias as “ideal states” then, by definition, utopias 
are unrealizable—for if they were ever realized, they would cease 
to be ideal; and thus cease to be utopias.  The real can approach the 
ideal, but can never become it.  This prima facie futility inherent to 
subscribing to an unrealizable ideal has inspired the pessimistic use 
of the adjective “utopian” to describe (read discredit) proposals or 
ideas seen as foolhardy or fantastic.  The origin of the anti-utopian 
attitude can be traced back at least as far as Engels and Marx, 
whose dismissal of utopian socialism was harsh and damning.7  
However, this criticism was also ultimately hypocritical.  Marx’s 
vision of an egalitarian socialist order arising from the carcass of 
an expired capitalism is as improbable a vision as any other 
utopian scheme.  This consideration has not, however, served to 
cleanse the stain that Marx has left upon utopia’s name. 
The influence of authoritative anti-utopian voices has been felt 
in far-ranging and important areas.  The Canadian public school 
system, for example, has come to play a part in indoctrinating 
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children against the corruptive influence of utopian schemes.  Too 
much idealism in the schools is looked upon by the crafters of 
curricula as deleterious, much the same as dieticians frown upon 
too much sugar in a child’s diet.  The reading list of high schools 
and junior high schools alike are stocked with such anti-utopian, or 
dystopian, readings as Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, John 
Wyndham’s The Chrysalids, and George Orwell’s Animal Farm, 
and 1984.  Perhaps the Department of Education prescribes these 
tomes as remedies for the “fairy-tale-thinking” of youthful 
daydreamers, but it is just as likely hoping to convey the message 
“Don’t try this at home” to nascent dissidents.  After all, 
utopianism is not only the refuge of pitiable escapists, but also 
ascendant subversives.8  Utopians of the latter type, who forcefully 
argue for alternate social arrangements and institutions, are viewed 
as threats to the status quo by those in power.  Utopianism, seen as 
laughable to the skeptical many, is also seen as threatening by the 
powerful few. 
Conservative academicians, eager to uphold the respectably 
sterile nature of their profession, have as much of an interest in 
deflating utopianism as anxious politicians do.  There is much 
administrative pressure put on professors and instructors to avoid 
being perceived by others as overtly subversive, or even “too 
idealistic.”  Defending utopianism has thus become the intellectual 
analogue to holding the Alamo.9  The usual attacks on utopian 
ideology focus on the “impracticable” or “preposterous” character 
of any particular vision being advocated.10  Yet utopia’s 
unrealizability may, ironically, be its most redeeming quality. 
Although the ideal state of affairs for humanity might 
theoretically be a “perpetual peace” of the kind Kant hoped for, it 
is generally accepted that in practice material conditions often 
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change, and that the interests of individuals are far too divergent to 
permit an enduring social harmony.  In fact, many authors of 
dystopias have predicted that perpetual peace would result in 
human stagnation, a ‘flat’ society wherein human virtue would 
atrophy.11  Understanding that utopia is a state that is not intended 
to be realized, but merely to be striven for, helps us evade the 
skeptic’s charge of “impracticability” and arrive at a revised 
conception of the utopian project.  That is to say, we may step 
inside the shoes of the fictional explorer who seeks out an already-
existing utopia, as opposed to playing the part of the social 
architect who creates her own.  Rather than worrying about what 
we will build, then, we should be worrying about what to pack. 
 
Or would you rather be a mule? 
 
 
UTOPIA AS JOURNEY, NOT DESTINATION 
 
Utopia’s value lies not in its relation to present practice but in its 
relation to a possible future.  Its “practical” use is to overstep the 
immediate reality to depict a condition whose clear desirability 
draws us on, like a magnet.12 
-Krishan Kumar 
 
Utopia, I want to argue, is not a “destination” in the ordinary sense 
of the word.  This is because utopia is, by definition, a perfect state 
of affairs,13 and it could easily be objected either that (a) perfection 
itself is impossible to attain, or (b) that there exists no objective 
criterion for perfection that would let us know when it had been 
attained.  Such a “destination” would truly put us on the road to 
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nowhere.  Rather, I would like to discuss utopia as a goal; as an 
abstract target.  Compare our movement towards utopia to the 
movement of Achilles towards the Tortoise in Zeno’s Paradox of 
Motion: Achilles constantly nears the Tortoise but never quite 
catches up to it, because it has moved on slightly by the time that 
he has made up the distance between himself and where it (the 
Tortoise) was previously.  This process can be thought to repeat 
itself in an infinite series of smaller and smaller distances.  Still, 
we must admit, this is a kind of progress.  It doesn’t so much 
matter whether or not we actually arrive at a utopia, whether or not 
there is a final, definitive moment of impact. What matters is that 
we are continually moving—perhaps imperceptibly at times—
towards our goal, and along the way constantly reforming and 
improving our sociopolitical lives. 
Still, if utopia is a journey, what makes it a trip worth taking 
(other than the fact that the road to utopia isn’t choked with other 
travelers)?  Having previously discussed the theoretical necessity 
of utopia, I will now argue for the desirability of utopia, by way of 
analogy.  Just as an individual, without any idea of who she would 
like to become, is unable to make sound choices regarding her 
future, so too is a people, without any conception of what kind of 
society they would like to live in, unable to make sound choices 
about its collective future.  Utopian thinking, then, is a necessary 
impetus for progress within any given culture; it is the carrot, 
dangling just out of reach, which keeps the mule moving forward.   
On an individual level, the analogue for utopia is excellence: in 
the schema of virtue ethics, it is in the act of striving towards 
excellence that one becomes a virtuous person.  Ostensibly, the 
aggregate of our individual strivings towards virtue should bring 
our society as a whole closer to collective excellence, or what we 
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might call a utopia, an “excellence of state.”  Indeed, utopia’s link 
to ethics lies even deeper than this, for if utopia is a “good” place, 
then “actions that lead to utopia are right actions.”14  This then, is 
the underlying ethos of utopianism: our “journey,” as it were, is 
one of a morally justified nature, almost providential in character, 
and inseparably bound to progress. 
Oscar Wilde once famously captured this line of thinking in the 
maxim, “Progress is the realization of Utopias.”15  And because a 
utopia—once realized—ceases, by definition, to be a utopia, 
progress never halts in its march ahead.  Thus it is in the act of 
striving to realize the ideal state that societal entropy and stasis are 
overcome, not in the realization of that ideal.16  Whether or not a 
utopia is physically realized is relevant neither to the endeavor of 
utopian theorizing, nor to utopianism’s greater role in political 
philosophy.17 
What does matter is that having a common utopian goal should, 
theoretically, produce a higher degree of social cooperation 
between the inhabitants of societies that have one, over those that 
do not.  To help us understand this, we can think about our social 
interactions generally as large, complex rational decision 
problems.  We come out best in such problems if we know the 
goals of the other agents working through the same problems at the 
same time as us (i.e., if there are any salient features of the 
problems which are known to all players).  If the players can 
successfully cooperate with each other towards a mutually 
beneficial goal, then they will maximize their best possible 
mutually acceptable outcomes and “win.”  This kind of outcome is 
possible in our society-wide utopian rational decision problem as 
stated, because what the salient feature is to each player (in any 
given situation) is the utopian vision itself.  If the utopian goal of a 
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society is known to each of its members, then each member will 
know, basically, (1) what to do in order to bring the utopian goal 
closer to realization, and (2) that each other member—if and when 
behaving rationally—will also be working towards that same 
goal.18  Under such conditions, helping our neighbors becomes 
easier for us to do, because in effect we are helping ourselves, as 
well as them, move closer towards our best possible mutually 
acceptable outcomes—in this way, conflicts of interest do not 
obtain in the context of the utopian enterprise. 
To enter into such a contract of cooperation is to adopt what 
Bernard Suits calls the “lusory attitude,” in other words, to desire 
to achieve a specific state of affairs (in this case, the realization of 
a utopia), and at the same time to desire to adhere to only legal 
and/or legitimate means of realizing that specific state of affairs.19  
This “lusory attitude” is what makes game-playing—or any other 
structured social activity for that matter—possible in the first 
place.  Oddly, however, to desire a specific state of affairs would 
require our players to have in mind a common utopian destination, 
even though they should never realistically expect to reach it.  Is 
such a proposition rationally feasible?  The answer to this question 
must be yes, for if we believe that (i) utopia is the theoretically 
optimal state of human affairs; that (ii) utopia is not realizable in 
practice; that (iii) working towards a common vision of utopia will 
promote a higher degree of societal cooperation than presently 
obtains; and that (iv) societies with high degrees of social 
cooperation are, ceteris paribus, more desirable than societies with 
low degrees of the same; then rationally we must also hold that (v) 
working towards a common vision of utopia is the most optimal 
state of human affairs realizable in practice.  Thus our cooperation 
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in utopian practices is rationally demanded of us, even if the 
utopian goal itself is not compatible with reality. 
Utopia, then, is not just any journey; it is a journey demanded of 
us by rationality—one that we must take with others who share our 
rational convictions and supra-rational goals.  The journey itself 
may be actual (we may engage in joint activist ventures or 
community-building) or figurative (we may simply read or write 
utopian fiction as part of a literary community).  Either way, once 
we have proceeded together for some distance down one of these 
roads, it may be possible to gaze back reflexively on where we 
have come from—without being turned into a pillar of salt in the 
process.  To put the point more finely: the practice of utopian 
journeying creates theoretical distance between ourselves and our 
home cultures; the distance required for us to be able to perform 
effective critiques of them, without giving rise to the fear that we 
are denigrating or imperiling ourselves in the process.  At the same 
time, utopia offers us nurture and support by proffering a surrogate 
hypothetical community: an atemporal, extra-spatial touchstone 
accessible to all those who are moved by its vision. 
 
 
UTOPIA AS DETACHED CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
In my utopia, human solidarity…is to be achieved not by inquiry 
but by imagination, the imaginative ability to see strange people as 
fellow sufferers.  Solidarity is not discovered but created.20 
- Richard Rorty 
 
The utopian thinker, claims Amitava Ray, is “free to imagine and 
create a world without being tied up to any particular type of 
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methodology.”21  Although utopias are, to a large extent, reactive 
products of their environments,22 they are also capable of 
transcending the boundaries of time, space, and culture.  The 
utopian writer is by no means prescient or omniscient, but through 
her imaginative faculties she is capable of portraying ideal ways of 
living set in the past or in the future, within her own country or on 
a distant planet, portraying lifestyles that closely resemble those of 
her own society or ones that differ radically from them.  Such feats 
of the imagination facilitate the act of distancing required for 
authors to perform critiques of their societies—from the outside as 
well as from within; from the hypothetical perspective of the 
utopian as well as from the actual perspective of the citizen. At the 
same time, new sites of solidarity are produced that cut across 
traditional social divides. 
The literary narrative of a utopia plays an important role in 
promulgating its message.  Not only does the narrative form make 
the utopian ideal accessible to the public in a manner not possible 
via discussion of pure theory alone; but it also suggests a “meta-
narrative,” if you will, between the society that is and the society 
that could be.  The reader, accordingly, is entreated to fill in the 
gaps between these disparate realities with their own thoughts, 
efforts, and real or figurative journeys. 
One problem, it might be objected, with articulating a positive 
vision of utopia is that others may have different visions of what 
utopia ought to be.  This would mean that one utopian might be 
engaged in a direct conflict of interest with another, a state I 
previously claimed was theoretically impossible for two rational 
utopian agents to find themselves in.  Such conflict would be 
devastating to utopian efforts, which require unity of purpose if 
they are to be conducive to societal cooperation.  Having 
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contrasting visions of utopia compete with each other would lead 
to a situation wherein no one vision of utopia could be approached; 
utopianism under these conditions comes, then, to resemble a war 
of all-against-all rather than a pleasurable stroll towards a mutual 
destination.  In a situation, then, where two pictures of utopia are 
mutually exclusive, we must decide which one of these utopias is 
the less rational of the two.  For the sake of avoiding conflicts of 
interest, we have to assume that only one of them can be the “true” 
utopia, and that the true utopia must be the more rational one. 
Let us consider that historical figures as diverse as Hitler and 
the Marquis de Sade have each had what have been called “utopian 
visions,” each of which greatly contrasted with what other people 
of their times would have considered to be an ideal scheme of 
social arrangements.  Hitler craved a Europe devoid of Jews, under 
German dominion, and the Marquis de Sade called for a culture of 
wanton sexuality aimed at the overthrow both church and 
monarchy.23  Yet both of these “utopias” excluded significant 
segments of their purported and potential audiences, and can 
hardly be said to have captured a rational, inclusive vision of the 
good for all.  The Marquis’ utopia fails to redress the obvious 
pitfalls of self-destruction and transgression against others that 
result from adherence to an ethos of unbridled hedonism, while 
Hitler’s utopia is straightforwardly morally abhorrent, and 
unapologetically so.  If utopia is to remain a “good place” then it 
must have the support of both those who will take up the journey 
there with us, and also those who our journeying would affect.  
This line of reasoning, however, again implies that there is only 
one “true” or “right” utopia: the least offensive, most inclusive and 
most rational utopia.  But, at the end of the day, what would such a 
Christopher YORKE 
______________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
 
new thinking: Winter/Spring 2004  12 
utopia look like?  And how could we conclude that it was “the 
right one?” 
In the face of these theoretical difficulties, Adorno’s concept of 
the negative utopia gains in appeal.  The main thrust of Adorno’s 
argument regarding negative utopias is that although we may never 
find a universally satisfactory idea of utopia to work towards, we 
may at least find a universal idea of what kind of society we don’t 
want to live in.  This is a picture of utopia in reverse: if only we 
can cut out the features of society that are undesirable to all, then 
what is left over should be (minimally) acceptable to everyone.  
But Adorno’s utopian journey has an endpoint—it does not go on 
forever, constantly striving to approach the ideal; rather, it runs out 
steam once it has succeeded in surgically amputating all of 
society’s universally undesirable features.  After this point, society 
can progress no further, but rather aimlessly drifts, bereft of a 
theoretical destination.  The sickness is cured, in this case, but at 
the cost of killing the patient. 
Though we must allow that sometimes monsters will attempt, in 
their own misguided ways and for their own misguided reasons, to 
build exclusive, irrational “utopias” to showcase and indulge their 
perverse fantasies, we must not allow this fact to deter us from 
constructing our own inclusive, positive vision of utopia: a rational 
utopia that incorporates and respects the preferences of as many 
potential members as possible.  A utopia perhaps not so different 
from the one Rawls hopes we can arrive at through wide reflective 
equilibrium in the original position.  After all, Rawls’ thought 
experiment is simply another variation on the narrative form that 
provides us with an alternate foundation upon which to base our 
social critiques.  It is in the practice of theorizing viable 
alternatives to existing social practices that we gain the altitude, so 
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to speak, to loom over our current ways of doing things and see the 
folly in them; to view the maze, as it were, from above.  A 
negative utopian vision cannot help us predict what will emerge 
from a cocoon—it cannot bring us the perspicuity to divine what 
the next stage of our society ought to be. Nor can it negotiate a full 
societal transformation—it can only surgically reform what already 
exists, bereft of a standpoint towards novel potential or emergent 
social practices.  And although the idea of constructing the “right” 
utopia might now seem to be a daunting project, it has not yet been 
shown it to be an impossible one: in fact, as I mentioned above, 
Rawls has brought us closer to this ideal than was previously 
thought to be possible. 
 
 
UTOPIA AS A STATE BUILDER 
 
Clear voiced cuckoo, 
Even you will need 
The silver wings of a crane 
To span the islands of Matsushima. 
- Sora (17
th
 century Japanese poet) 
 
Despite the fact that utopias are generally formulated for the 
purposes of facilitating social cooperation, ethical instruction, and 
critiques of sociopolitical practices, at certain historical junctures 
utopian devotees have attempted to construct earthly 
representations of their “good places.”  Those who tired of the 
ceaseless utopian journey set up campsites to rest in; these 
campsites slowly became villages; these villages became towns; 
and the towns became vibrant cities.  But these physical traces do 
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not a utopia make; for utopia, we must recall, is unrealizable by its 
nature.  Utopia, then, is only something that is ideologically 
experienced among the members of a community… perhaps the 
cooperative ethos of the journey I spoke of earlier.  Along the way, 
land may be cleared, slogans formulated, and buildings erected, but 
these activities of state-building are merely the expressions of a 
community acting in unison: and it is the character of those 
actions, not their products, which can be fairly characterized as 
utopian. 
From the religious utopia of the “promised land,” to the 
socialist utopia of life under communism, the promise of a better 
tomorrow has been evoked perennially for the purposes of building 
solidarity within various communities.  The physical edifices 
constructed by these communities, however, were considered to be 
further down the line in importance than the mental states of their 
community members.  State building took a back seat to social 
wellbeing; earthly profit was secondary to purity of practice.   
Representing the opposite perspective, it was Karl Mannheim 
who most influentially advocated the idea that the value of a utopia 
should be judged by how realizable it is.24  This judgment of 
“value.” it seems, can only be extended to the external trappings of 
a utopia—i.e., to what extent the utopian state has been made 
materially manifest.  The work of Rawls would seem to be in line 
with Mannheim’s analysis, as Rawls claims to be interested in 
engineering a “realistic utopia” via his ideal theory, which would 
require the construction of new (or the reform of preexisting) 
institutions aimed towards ensuring optimal fairness in social 
practices.  Granting Mannheim and Rawls a temporary reprieve 
from the definitional objection to a realizable utopia, voiced earlier 
in this paper, we leave ourselves free to consider the following 
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questions: “What would be the consequences of a utopia-come-
true?” and “How would such a state of affairs manifest itself?” 
Having freed utopia of its definitional constraint of 
unrealizability, it seems as if we might have some trouble 
recognizing the realization of a utopia from the attainment of any 
other state of affairs arising from the communal efforts of various 
groups of people.  Let’s say, for example, that the Starbucks 
Coffee Company just opened up its one billionth locale.  Now the 
ratio of Starbucks coffee shops to human beings on Earth would be 
(approximately) one to seven (1:7).  So the goals of a group of 
people have been met, and no one really objects to the expansion 
of the Starbucks operation on moral grounds: no one, for example, 
is barred from entering their stores. A decent cup of coffee is now 
available virtually anywhere in the world, and to further sweeten 
the deal the Starbucks Coffee Company dedicates itself to giving a 
larger portion of its profits back to charity.  Everybody wins, or so 
it would seem.  But would this state of affairs count as a utopia-
come-true?  I would like to say that it wouldn’t, because most 
Starbucks employees (unless they’re fanatically dedicated to their 
company) are just “along for the ride”: that is, they don’t share a 
truly “utopian” vision—a vision that is fully inclusive of all 
members of the organization, a vision that each of those members 
is equally rationally compelled to adhere to and continually strive 
for.  And the owners of the Starbucks Coffee Company, having the 
ultimate goal of making more and more money by having more 
and more people drink more and more of its coffee, fare no better.  
Their goal (in and of itself) constitutes a system with no endpoint, 
no appreciation of its own limits.  So it’s not that Starbucks is not 
utopian because its goals are reachable—quite the contrary—it’s 
that Starbucks is not utopian because its goal is of the wrong kind.   
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Having the “right” utopia implies having the “right” goals.  In 
this way, we can say that the most rational utopia requires a 
cosmopolitan component—we must consider each human to be a 
potential member of our utopian society when we settle upon our 
utopian goal.  There are important theoretical reasons supporting 
inclusiveness as a criterion of utopian “rightness,” which I shall 
explore in more detail below. 
Literary utopias are usually portrayed as having a cosmopolitan 
ethos towards the practice of hospitality: guests are typically 
invited into utopia and guided through it in order that they come to 
understand how deficient and/or inferior their home cultures are. 
Kant no doubt had these kinds of cultural exchanges in mind 
(albeit in the real world) when he wrote on the subject of 
cosmopolitan hospitality.  But a “true” utopia—the utopia that lies 
not in bricks and mortar but in the relationships between the 
utopians themselves—cannot bear outsiders; or at least outsiders 
who are beyond utopian conversion.  The arrival of the recalcitrant 
stranger signals the destruction of paradise, as it is the stranger 
who exposes the willfully overlooked faults that make the illusion 
of utopia possible to maintain for its inhabitants.25  This 
disillusionment upsets the internal dynamic that exists between the 
members of a utopian community and draws into question the 
beliefs in the utopian ideal that facilitated a high degree of social 
cooperation in the first place.  The death of the utopian dream 
symbolically triggers the dramatic undoing of all communal 
relationships and efforts, and even the physical architecture of the 
community will be neglected and eventually crumble once the 
members’ conviction in their utopian vision wanes. 
The singular vision required by one’s adherence to a given 
utopia is not unlike the blind faith required of believers in certain 
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religions.  Evidence of the viability of foreign and attractive ways 
of life poses a serious challenge to the faith of utopian devotees, 
just as the worship of other gods can serve to draw into question 
the validity of one’s theological convictions.  The other ways of 
life, often, become the new “utopias” to be sought after.  Utopian 
beliefs, like religious beliefs, are at their core very personal: there 
may not be a “fact of the matter” in the world regarding what is 
and what is not the best way for everyone to live.  Thus again we 
face the charge that it may never be possible to formulate “the right 
utopia.”  Still, the utopian has resort to reason: the stranger can 
hopefully be convinced, through rational argument, that certain 
practices of the outside world are indeed less desirable than those 
carried out within the utopian community, and come to see the 
normative desirability of utopia.  It is this possibility of rational 
conversion through discourse that is the greatest weapon in the 
utopian’s arsenal; and it is the practice of cosmopolitan hospitality 
that brings outsiders within its firing range. 
Utopianism is an absolutist ideology—it strives to include every 
person in the world.  Its vision reaches out to encompass all of 
humanity in its grasp; each and every stranger must come to 
recognize its superior practices.  But when failing to achieve this 
level of ideological subsumption in reality, it must keep outsiders 
and non-believers safely at bay.  In Sir Francis Bacon’s utopia, 
New Atlantis, we see this tension manifest: the existence of the 
island of Bensalem must be kept secret from the rest of the world, 
or paradise will be lost.  Utopia, if it hopes to survive, cannot be 
the treading-ground of barbarians who would seek to exploit it.  
But the only reliable—and utopian—manner in which to eliminate 
the threat of outsiders is to make everyone an insider through 
rational persuasion.  We can safely assume, however, that there are 
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individuals and groups that will refuse to engage in rational 
discourse with the utopians, and their existence will therefore pose 
a great danger to the continuing success of utopian practices.  
Thus, if utopian practices are to persevere, utopian communities 
must have recourse to non-rational (yet legitimate) methods of 
persuasion, along with a theoretical basis that is wide enough to 
absorb discontents along with paradigmatic utopian cooperators.  
Utopia must therefore take the form of global governance—an all-
encompassing system of government the rejection of which would 
be a futile gesture, with access to overwhelming military strength 
too great to resist. 
In my essay “Making the Case for Strong Global 
Governance,”26 I argue that the surest route towards minimizing the 
risk of international military conflict, and establishing a peaceful 
network of worldwide social cooperation, is to strengthen and 
expand existing forms of global governance.  I posit that the 
alternative—the continuation of the practice of military 
competition between states—can only result in the continuation of 
existing, and prosecution of future, wars.  The idea, however, of a 
strong global government is seen as “utopian in a bad way” to 
many.  Theorists like Michael Walzer worry that the establishment 
of a world-state would lead to a centralized totalitarian dominion.  
But a utopian world-state would only be truly utopian if all rational 
citizens of the world-state rationally subscribed to its particular 
utopian vision—as we cannot be dominated by that to which we 
freely and rationally give our ongoing assent.  The problem here is 
a practical one: how are we to formulate and promulgate such a 
utopia and then secure the rational assent of each potentially 
incorporated individual?  In the past, wars have served to advertise 
and advance ideologies.  Utopia, however, possesses no cannons 
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(only canons)—and even if it did come to have a military arm, a 
fully inclusive utopia would not have call to use it in bloody 
conquest, but rather only in defending itself and policing non-
rational groups within it.  Patience and rational deliberation are 
acceptable strategies where the application of force—except in the 
sense of “the force of the better argument”—is not. 
In time, perhaps some definitive list of universal psychological 
and sociological similarities between peoples of all cultures could 
be assembled, and a socio-scientific utopian constitution 
formulated on its basis, in the tradition of B. F. Skinner’s Walden 
Two.  Or perhaps we will (each of us) have the occasion to enter 
into a global original position at some time or another.  Rawls, 
after all, thinks this is the best way to get at principals of maximal 
fairness that will hold over time and across cultures.  Whatever the 
ultimate means of formulating such a utopia, they are not as 
crucially important as adherence to the general utopian principle of 
social cooperation.  This principle in itself can guide our actions 
now, while we wait, and hope, and work together towards 
universal agreement on a mutually ennobling end.  This is the 
normative role of utopianism in political philosophy. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Utopianism is more than a longing for a time and place that never 
was; rather, it is the hope for a time and place that might yet be.  
Nostalgia for times and places we never lived in, and that perhaps 
never even existed, I call “malchronesis”: the feeling that one is 
living in the wrong place at the wrong time.  Malchronesis, I posit, 
is not an expression of utopian longing, but rather a symptom of 
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utopian failure—the failure to act to realize a utopia in one’s own 
time; the failure to find belonging in a cooperative human venture.  
Utopianism is more than just a way of doing things: it is a way of 
thinking that holds out hope for instilling a universal sense of 
belonging in humanity, and thus saving humanity from its self-
destructive elements.  It is a way of thinking that frees us from a 
Hobbesian state-of-nature mindset and allows us to move towards 
a more positive conception of human nature: towards a lasting 
(though perhaps not perpetual) peace.  We do not live up to our 
collective intellectual responsibility when we both theoretically 
and practically settle for less than this.  Utopia is better than a self-
fulfilling prophesy: it never even has to be realized in order for it 
to produce the best possible mutually beneficial and practicable 
state of affairs, increased social cooperation and harmonious 
relationships with others.  We tell our children the story of utopia, 
and that is enough to put their fears, and our own, to sleep. 
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25. I am inclined to insert a related note from the world of pop culture here. 
Those familiar with the original Star Trek series can attest that the dramatic 
arrival of the outsider (usually in guise of Captain James Tiberius Kirk—
played by McGill alumni William Shatner) symbolically signals the 
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in the form of mock (Styrofoam) masonry. 
26. Presented at ‘Colloque Fodar: Perspectives Philosophiques sur la 
Mondialisation’, at the University of Quebec at Montreal, October 2003. 
